Non Bis in Idem and the International Criminal Court by Daniels, Reynaud Neil
Northwestern University School of Law 
International Criminal Law Research Paper: RN Daniels 
Instructor: Professor David Scheffer 
 
Non bis In Idem and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
 
Introduction 
 It has been said that the principle against twice punishing an individual for the 
same crime is as old as the common law itself.1 The roots of the principle can be 
traced back to Roman law and ancient biblical law.  It has long been part of English 
common law and first received constitutional recognition in the form of the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Indeed it has been recognized at 
national level, in some form or other, across the globe.   
 
1 J Hunter “Development of the Rule against Double Jeopardy” Journal of Legal History (1984) 3-4 
2The principle has been recognized at a national level among almost all common law 
countries, either by incorporation into their constitutions or by incorporation into 
statutory law.2 The non bis in idem principle has found a home in at least fifty 
constitutions3 including countries such as Canada,4 New Zealand,5 South Africa6 and 
India.7 There are vastly different approaches however, with some systems prohibiting 
successive prosecutions for the same conduct after an acquittal or conviction and 
others permitting further trials where there are newly discovered facts or where there 
has been a fundamental defect in the earlier trial.  Others permit repeated prosecutions 
but prohibit double punishment. 
 The double jeopardy principle, as it is known in the United States, is intimately 
related to non bis in idem (from the Latin maxim nemo bis vexari pro una et eadam 
causa meaning ‘a man shall not be twice vexed or tried for the same cause’).  
Although conceptually similar, the primary difference between double jeopardy and 
non bis in idem is that double jeopardy operates only within a single legal system 
while the identity of the prosecuting power is not relevant to the application of non 
 
2 KC Pillai Double Jeopardy Protection : A Comparative Overview (Mittal Publications) 1988, 1 
3 M.C. Bassiouni “Human Rights in Criminal Justice: Identifying International Protections in National 
Constitutions” (1993) 3 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 247, 289 
4 Section 11(h) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that any person charged with an 
offence “has the right, if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again and, if found guilty and 
punished for the offence, not to be tried or punished for it again” 
5 Section 26(2) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights provides that “No one who has been finally acquitted of, 
or pardoned for, an offence shall be tried or punished for it again” 
6 Section 35(3)(m) of the South African Constitution provides that every person has the right to a fair trial 
which includes the right not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for which that person 
has previously been either acquitted or convicted” 
7 Article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution provides that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the 
same offence more than once. 
3bis in idem.8 Non bis in idem relates to numerous issues including; the recharging of 
an accused with the same or another offence, the framing of an indictment, the 
sentencing of an accused on multiple convictions (double punishment), new trials, 
appeals, revision, the relationship between courts and between states.9
The principle of non bis in idem plays a fundamentally important role within the 
criminal justice system.  Its rationale lies principally in the need to protect 
individuals, with their limited access to resources, from being harassed through 
repeated prosecutions by the powerful state, with its access to extensive resources.10 
It prevents the state from attempts to retry facts underlying an acquittal11 thereby 
limiting erroneous convictions which could flow from the fact that defendants do not 
have the resources and energy to fight against repeated and vexatious prosecutions.  
Non bis in idem protects individuals against multiple punishments for the same 
offence, so-called double counting, in the absence of authorization by the legislature.  
The common law articulation of the principle, which may be traced to Sir William 
Blackstone, conceived of double jeopardy in relation to procedural and substantive 
blameworthiness, i.e. the need to avoid multiple punishment of a single act of 
blameworthy and criminal conduct.12 
8 D. Lopez “Not Twice for the Same: How the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine if Used to Circumvent Non bis in 
Idem” Vanderbilt J Transnat’l L. 1263 2000, 1272 
9 I Tallgren “Ne bis in Idem” in O. Triffterer (Ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 1999 (Publisher  Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft)420  
10 Green v United States 355 US 184 at 187-88; see further D Lopez note 8 at 1263  
11 Brown v Ohio 432 US 161 
12 G. Thomas III Double Jeopardy: The History and the Law (New York Univ. Press) 1998, 5 
4In addition, non bis in idem operates to bring criminal proceedings to finality, and 
is therefore of benefit to the defendant as well as to society.  Furthermore, it operates 
to uphold the integrity of the administration of justice by limiting conflicting judicial 
rulings.  However, it must be tempered by the need to bring criminals to justice and to 
punish them.  
 Non bis in idem operates at three levels; firstly, it operates in relation to multiple 
prosecutions within a state (internal application).  Secondly, it operates between 
different sovereigns (first-tier international application).  Thirdly, it operates with 
respect to relations between states and international tribunals (second-tier 
international application).  At an international level, the nature of transnational crimes 
and the applicable jurisdictional principles13 could leave defendants at risk of 
prosecution for international crimes by a number of sovereigns, as well international 
criminal tribunals.   
 This paper will analyze the formulation of the principle in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court14 (hereafter “the Rome Statute”) and speculate on the 
level of protection it will afford to defendants indicted for international crimes.  The 
first part of the paper will look at the national application of non bis in idem,
particularly looking at the United States.  The second part gives a brief overview of 
 
13 A state may assert jurisdiction over: (1) all criminal acts that occur within its territory and over all person 
responsible for such conduct, regardless of their nationality (the territoriality principle) (2) aliens who 
commit acts abroad that are considered prejudicial to the safety of the state or it security (3) their own 
nationals who commit crimes abroad (4) those persons who commit offences abroad which harm the 
nationals of the state (passive personality) (5) the exercise of universal jurisdiction in respect of crimes 
under customary international law (such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture) see 
J. Dugard International Law A South African Perspective (Juta) 2000, 133-142 
14 2187 UNTS 3, entered into force on July 1, 2002 
5the principle in its international context.  The third part looks, very cursorily, at the 
events in East Timor and Cambodia, to better understand the context for the certain 
provisions in the text of the Rome Statute.  The fourth section looks specifically at the 
text of the Rome Statute.   
Part I: Double Jeopardy and the Fifth Amendment  
The United States Constitution Fifth Amendment famously declares “…nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice out in jeopardy of life or 
limb…”  At first glance this appears simple and straight forward.  It appears to protect 
individuals against being placed at risk of further punishment, through further 
criminal proceedings in relation to the same offence, following an acquittal or 
conviction.  However, this apparent simplicity is deceiving.  To begin with the courts 
must determine when they are dealing with the same offence for the purposes of the 
Fifth Amendment.  The Supreme Court has been anything but consistent in its 
development of a proper theory.   
In Diaz v United States15 the Supreme Court stated: “The homicide charged 
against the accused in the Court of First Instance and the assault and battery for which 
he was tried before the justices of the peace, although identical in some of their 
elements, were distinct offenses in both law and fact…the justice of the peace, 
although possessed of jurisdiction to try the accused or assault and battery, was 
 
15 Diaz v United States 223 US 442, 448-49 (1912) 
6without jurisdiction to try him for homicide…It follows that the plea of former 
jeopardy disclosed no obstacle to the prosecution for homicide”  
 In Diaz therefore same offence meant the same offence.  However, this was 
followed by Blockburger v United States.16 The defendant had been charged and 
convicted of two offences, viz. selling drugs without the original packaging and 
selling drugs without a written order, both violations of Harrison Narcotic Act.  The 
Supreme Court considered the proposition that the separate indictments violated the 
protection against double jeopardy and held that the defendant could be indicted with 
two offences because each required proof of an additional element not required by the 
other.  Under Blockburger a greater offense is generally treated as the same offense as 
each of its lesser included offenses.  The Blockburger test has often been critiqued by 
commentators because, when rigidly applied, it leads to inequitable and absurd 
results.17 Applying Blockburger, attempted murder must be treated as being the same 
offence as premeditated murder.  Although the Blockburger test was not formulated 
by reference to successive prosecutions, it was subsequently applied in those 
circumstances.18 
In Brown v Ohio19 the defendant had been charged and convicted, in the county 
where he was apprehended, of joyriding.  Subsequently, in a different county, he was 
indicted for autotheft.  The Supreme Court accepted that joyriding was a lesser 
 
16 Blockburger v United States 284 US 299 (1932) 
17 A. Amar “Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple” 106 Yale L.J. 1807 (1996-1997);  M Zeidy “Doctrine of 
Double Jeopardy in International Criminal and Human Rights Law” Mediterranean J. of Hum Rts. (2002) 
183.  
18 Note 12, 52 
19 Brown v Ohio 432 US 161 (1977)  
7included offence because auto theft required proof of joyriding (as well as proof that 
the accused intended to permanently deprive the owner of possession of the vehicle).  
Accordingly, the auto theft indictment was impermissible.    
Grady v Corbin20 marked a shift from Blockburger. The accused had been 
convicted of driving while intoxicated and failing to keep to his lane, a traffic 
violation.  When it later came to light that the victim of the accident, caused by the 
defendant’s traffic violation, had died from his injuries, the defendant was charged 
and convicted of manslaughter, reckless homicide and drunken driving.  On appeal, 
the Supreme Court articulated the test as follows: a second prosecution may not be 
held “if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that [second] 
prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offence of which 
the defendant has already been prosecuted”.21 Accordingly, Court found that the 
accused should not be placed in further jeopardy for manslaughter, reckless homicide 
or drunken driving.  
 In United States v Dixon22 the Supreme Court returned to the Blockburger test.  
Here, two defendants had been convicted of contempt of court for violating courts 
orders, which barred them from committing offences on their release from custody.  
They were then prosecuted for the same conduct to which the court orders related.  
The Supreme Court ruled that, because two of the offences contained the exact same 
 
20 Grady v Corbin 495 US 508 (1990) 
21 Id at 510 
22 United States v Dixon 509 US 688 (1993) 
8elements as the contempt charge, these charges could not survive the double jeopardy 
prohibition.     
The brief sample of the Supreme Court jurisprudence demonstrates an 
inconsistent conception of the double jeopardy protection, at times the approach is 
broader and other times more limited than is warranted.  Although the double 
jeopardy clause in the Fifth Amendment limits the government to one bite at the 
cherry, very little else is clear.  The Court should be faithful to the constitutional text.  
The double jeopardy clause was clearly intended to relate only to same offences.  
This is consistent with the historical development of the double jeopardy protection.23 
By enquiring into the elements of the offenses and by trying to establish whether the 
proof of one offence necessarily required proof of another, the Court has run into 
massive interpretive problems.  Lenient treatment of auto theft and manslaughter does 
not serve the interests of justice.  There is no sound legal argument or policy 
justification why prior convictions for lesser-included offenses should bar subsequent 
prosecutions for the greater offense.  As the Court discovered, double jeopardy 
pertinently raises the question of appropriate levels of deference to the Legislature (in 
regard to its role in creating offences) but easy solutions are elusive. 
In respect of multiple prosecutions, the rules of the game are somewhat clearer.  
The general rule is that acquittals, whether by a jury or court, based on the 
insufficiency of the evidence presented, are not capable of being appealed by the 
 
23 Note 17 at 1816, quoting Sir W Blackstone “It is to be observed that the pleas of atrefois acquit and 
atrefois convict…must be upon a prosecution for the same identical act and crime” 
9state.24 Whether acquittal verdicts result from error is immaterial, the defendant must 
not be put in jeopardy twice for the same offence.25 A second prosecution of the 
same offence is however permissible when a convicted defendant has successfully set 
aside his conviction on grounds other than the insufficiency of the evidence.26 On the 
assumption that there is a “continuing jeopardy” until final judgment, mistrials 
justified by “manifest necessity” may be followed by a second trial27 even if the 
mistrial resulted from an innocent procedural error by the prosecutor.28 However, 
mistrials caused by the defendant or granted at the defendant’s request do not prohibit 
a retrial.29 
The double jeopardy protection is limited by the dual sovereignty doctrine.  The 
doctrine, set out in United States v Lanza30 establishes that the double jeopardy 
clause does not bar prosecutions for the same offense at state and federal level.  The 
Court stated “ “we have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different 
sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory…It 
follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an 
offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each”.31 The 
Supreme Court has also confirmed that, because states are equally sovereign, a 
defendant convicted under the laws of one state may be indicted under the laws of 
 
24 United States v Scott 437 US 82 (1978) 
25 United States v Martin Linen Supply Co 430 US 564, 571 (1977) 
26 Ball v United States 163 US 662 (1896) 
27 Arizona v Washington 434 US 497 
28 Illinois v Somerville 410 US 458 (1973) 
29 Oregon v Kennedy 456 US 667 (1982) 
30 United States  v Lanza 260 US 377  
31 Id at 382 
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another state for the same offence.32 Furthermore, the dual sovereignty approach also 
operates in respect of sequential foreign and federal prosecutions.33 Although the so-
called “sham exception”34 limits further prosecutions by different sovereigns if the 
second prosecution is a cover for a prosecution by the first sovereign, who failed at its 
first attempt, this is a limited and narrow exception.   
Under English common law, there is an absolute bar against indicting a defendant 
for the same offence twice if the accused has been acquitted or convicted.  This 
absolute prohibition is now subject to a statutory exception, in the form of the 
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act (1996), where acquittals are tainted by 
interference with or intimidation of jurors and witnesses.35 Artefois acquit/convict 
applies only when the offences in the first and second prosecutions are identical in 
fact and law.  Unlike the dual sovereignty approach of the United States, there is a 
long line of authority which indicates that the English courts will not try defendants 
who have already been tried by foreign courts with competent jurisdiction for the 
same offences.36 English common law provides that, subject to a few limited 
exceptions, the prosecution has no right of appeal.37 In 1998 the United Kingdom 
passed the Human Rights Act which incorporates the [European] Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms38 (the European 
Convention).  It remains to be seen how the common law defenses of atrefois acquit 
32 Heath v Alabama 474 US 82 (1985) 
33 United States v Rashed 83 F Supp 2d 96 (DC 1999)
34 Bartkus v Illinois 359 US 121 (1959) 
35 Law Commission of England and Wales: Double Jeopardy Paper No 156 (2001), par 2.15 
36 Note 8 supra at 1296 
37 Note 35 supra  
38 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953 
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and atrefois convict will be influenced by Additional Protocol 7 to the European 
Convention39 when it ratifies the Protocol.40 
Part II: Non bis In Idem in the International Context 
 Although commentators argue that the internal application of non bis in idem has 
achieved the status of customary international law, all agree that its application as 
between different sovereigns, or as between nations and international courts, is less 
entrenched or developed.41 Apart from extradition law42 most commentators agree 
that the international application of non bis in idem cannot be considered customary 
international law nor can it be considered a general principle of international law.   
At an international level, the application of non bis in idem is hindered by several 
factors, principally the fact that: (a) recognition of foreign criminal judgments is a 
limitation of sovereignty43 (b) there are wide disparities in respect of its 
implementation at national level44 (c) recognition of foreign criminal judgments, or 
 
39 (ETS 117), entered into force Nov. 1, 1988. Note that the UK has not yet ratified Additional Protocol 7. 
(http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=117&CM=7&DF=5/3/2006&CL=ENG) 
40 The UK has not ratified Additional Protocol 7 but may yet do so, see note 35, par 1.9 
(http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=117&CM=7&DF=5/3/2006&CL=ENG),  
41 A Cassese International Criminal Law 2003 (Oxford Univ. Press) 319 
42 Most extradition treaties contain some form of non bis in idem principles, however the scope of such 
provisions are limited. The treaties often provide that non bis in idem may be used as a ground to refuse 
extradition because of an earlier prosecution in the courts of the requested state. It is seldom for a treaty to 
permit refusal of extradition on the grounds of a prior prosecution in the requesting state. It is even more 
unusual for a treaty to permit refusal on the basis that there has been a previous prosecution in a third state. 
See G Conway “Ne bis in Idem in International Law” 3 Int’l Crim L. Rev 217 2003 at 233  
43 See note 13 supra 
44 Conway, note 42 supra, sets out the biggest areas of variance: the common law tradition generally 
applies the principle in abstract (by reference to the offence committed) while the civil law tradition prefers 
a concrete application (by reference to the factual conduct that forms the basis of the offence); the common 
law approach is conceived in territorial, rather than national, terms.  Furthermore, the common law tradition 
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judgments of international courts, require a high degree of faith in the administration 
of justice by the other jurisdictions.45 Below, the relevant aspects of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights46 (hereafter “the ICCPR”) the European 
Convention and the Convention on Schengen47 (hereafter “the Schengen 
Convention”) are briefly discussed.  
Non Bis In Idem in Multilateral Treaties 
Article 14(7) of the ICCPR provides that: “No one shall be liable to be tried or 
punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or 
acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country”  
 In 1984 the United Nations Human Rights Committee (hereafter “the HRC”) 
published its views on article 14(7) of the ICCPR.  The HRC noted in General 
Comment 13 that states have expressed differing views on the resumption of criminal 
cases and some have felt it necessary to make reservations in that respect.  The HRC 
noted that most states distinguish between the resumption of a trial in exceptional 
circumstances and the prohibition of a re-trial under the principle of double jeopardy. 
At the outset it should be noted that article 14(7) refers to final conviction and 
final acquittal.  Thus double jeopardy does not enter into the picture until final 
 
is to prohibit appeals by prosecutors against acquittals or light sentences whereas the civil tradition 
generally contains no such bar and the state may appeal acquittals due to errors of law or errors of fact.   
45 Note 41, 318 
46 ICCPR 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar 23, 1976 
47 See http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/l_239/l_23920000922en00010473.pdf (last visited 3 
May 2006) 
13
judgment is delivered.  The textual formulation therefore permits a second 
prosecution or trial pending a final judgment under the law or penal procedure of the 
state concerned.  By specifically referring to the laws and penal procedures of each 
country, the formulation of article 14(7) lends itself to a narrow application in that it 
does not prevent prosecutions for the same offence by different sovereigns, a dual 
sovereignty approach.  This was affirmed by the HRC in AP v Italy.48 AP had been 
convicted of conspiring to illegally exchange currency in Switzerland.  He was 
sentenced to two years imprisonment, after which he was expelled from the country.  
Italy indicted him for the same offence and asked France to extradite him so that he 
could stand trial in Italy.  France refused but Italy convicted him in absentia. AP 
referred an individual complaint to the HRC alleging that Italy sought to violate his 
right against double jeopardy.  The HRC ruled that the complaint was inadmissible 
because article 14(7) prohibited double jeopardy only in regard to adjudication within 
a given state.  
In Jijon v Ecuador49 the HRC was again asked to consider article 14(7). In this 
case, the complainant submitted that his right, not to be subjected to double jeopardy, 
was violated by Ecuador.  He had been convicted of participating in a bank robbery 
and served a one year prison sentence.  Upon his release he was charged for the 
unlawful possession of firearms during the bank robbery.  However, the Ecuadorian 
Superior Court had dismissed the charges.  Jijon argued that his right not to be 
subjected to double jeopardy had been violated.  The HRC held that there was no 
 
48 AP v Italy Communication 204/1986 (16 July 1986) 
49 Jijon v Ecuador Communication No. 277/1998: Ecuador 08/04/92 
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violation declaring that “while the second indictment concerned a specific element of 
the same matter examined in the initial trial, Mr Teran was not tried or convicted a 
second time, since the Superior Court had quashed the indictment, thus vindicating 
the principle of ne bis in idem”.   
The European Convention makes no express reference to non bis in idem but
article 4(1) of Additional Protocol 7 to the European Convention declares that “No 
one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the 
jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally 
acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State.”  
However, article 4(2) makes specific provision to re-open a case in accordance with 
national laws if there are new or newly discovered facts or if there has been serious 
defect in the previous proceedings, which could have affected the outcome of the 
case.  Article 4(2) is also flexible enough to accommodate different domestic 
approaches.  The sub-article provides that the principle does not in any way limit the 
right of convicted persons to re-open of the case in circumstances permitted under 
national law.   
In Oliveira v Switzerland,50 the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter “the 
ECHR”) considered article 4 of Additional Protocol 7 and took a narrower view than 
it previously had in Gradinger v Austria.51 Oliveira had been driving on a snow 
 
50 Oliveira v Switzerland 25711/94 [1998] ECHR 68  
51 Gradinger v Austria 15963/90 [1995] ECHR 36. Gradinger had been convicted of causing death by 
negligent driving.  During the proceedings, the court had determined that his alcohol limit did not exceed 
the prescribed limit.  After the convictions, new evidence came to light and he was given a fine for driving 
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covered road and was unable to control her vehicle because she had not adjusted her 
speed.  The vehicle veered into another car and caused injuries to the occupant of that 
vehicle.  The police magistrate fined her for violating the Road Traffic Act, by failing 
to drive safely and control her vehicle.  She was subsequently fined by the district 
court for negligently causing physical injury to the occupant of the other vehicle.  The 
ECHR held that article 4 did not prohibit people from being tried twice for the 
different offences arising from the same set of facts.  
Apart from extradition treaties, there have been few attempts to establish the 
international application of the non bis in idem principle (i.e. preventing state Y from 
conducting further prosecutions following a prosecution for the same offence by state 
X).  Early attempts to do so in Europe failed.52 These were followed by the Schengen 
Convention which has been more successful, with at least ten member states.53 
Article 54 of the Schengen Convention provides that “A person whose trial has 
been finally disposed of in one Contracting Party may not be prosecuted in another 
Contracting Party for the same acts provided that, if a penalty has been imposed, it 
has been enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or can no longer be 
enforced under the laws of the sentencing Contracting Party.”  However, article 55 
builds in several exceptions which contracting states may adopt in relation to article 
 
with excess alcohol in his blood system.  The ECHR noted that the offences were different but found that 
article 4 had been violated because both charges were based on the same conduct. 
52 See: European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments (ETS No. 070, entered 
into force July 26, 1974) and the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters 
(ETS No. 073, entered into force March 30, 1978) have been ratified by very few states.  
53 C Van den Wyngaert & G Stessens “The International Non Bis in Idem Principle: Resolving Some of the 
Unanswered Questions” 48 Int’l Comp. L. Q. 779 1999, 787 
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54.  The first exception relates to instances where the acts to which the foreign 
judgment relates occurred in whole or in part on its own territory.  The second 
exception relates to instances where the acts, to which the foreign judgment relates, 
constitute an offence against the national security or other equally important interests 
of that contracting party.   
International Criminal Tribunals  
 The London Charter of 1945 established the legal basis for the punishment of 
Nazi war criminals, however the nuts and bolts for the trials of the major war 
criminals were provided by article 11 of the Constitution of the International Military 
Tribunal (hereafter the IMT”). Article 11 provided that “Any person convicted by the 
Tribunal may be charged before a national, military or occupation court…with a 
crime other than of membership in a criminal group or organization and such court 
may, after convicting him, impose upon him punishment independent of and 
additional to the punishment imposed by the IMT for participation in the criminal 
activities of such group or organization.”  Clearly this was an extremely weak 
formulation of the non bis in idem principle.54 Although the IMT55 occasionally 
made statements to articulate their respect for the principle of non bis in idem there 
was in fact little real concern for the principle.56 
54 Note 24, 226 
55 The Tribunal stated “We conceive the only purpose of this Tribunal is to bring to trial war criminals that 
have not already been tried” Trial of War Criminals before the Nuremburg Military Tribunals under 
Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. VI at 1213 (1952) in O. Triffterer, note 9 supra at 424 
56 Id 
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 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereafter “the ICTR”) 
established by Security Court Resolution 955 (1994) incorporated the non bis in idem 
principle in article 9,57 as did article 10 of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter “the ICTY”) established by Security 
Council resolution 827 (1993).58 In the Tadic case, the defense claimed a violation of 
non bis in idem because proceedings on the same indictment had already commenced 
against him in Germany.59 The Trial Chamber dismissed the claim on the grounds 
that “the accused has not yet been the subject of a judgment on the merits of any of 
the charges for which he has been indicted” 60 However the ICTY did hold that 
Germany, which had deferred the case to the ICTY, could not again prosecute Tadic 
for the same facts after the disposition of his case at the ICTY.61 
57 Article 9 provides that (1) No person shall be tried before a national court for acts constituting serious 
violations of international humanitarian law under the present Statute, for which he or she has already been 
tried by the International Tribunal for Rwanda (2) A person who has been tried by a national court for acts 
constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law may be subsequently tried by the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda only if (a) The act for which he or she was tried was characterized as an 
ordinary crime; or (b) The national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were designed to 
shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case was not diligently prosecuted (3) 
In considering the penalty to be imposed on a person convicted of a crime under the present Statute, the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda shall take into account the extent to which any penalty imposed by a 
national court on the same person for the same act has already been served.   
58 Article 10 provides that “(1) No person shall be tried by a national court for acts constituting serious 
violations of international humanitarian law under the present Statute,  for which he or she has already been 
tried by the International Tribunal. (2) Any person who has been tried by a national court for acts 
constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law may be subsequently tried by the 
International Tribunal if: (a) the act for which he or she was tried was characterized as an ordinary crime, 
or (b) the national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were designed to shield the accused 
from international criminal responsibility, or the case was not diligently prosecuted. (3) In considering the 
penalty to be imposed on a person convicted of a crime under the present Statute, the International Tribunal 
shall take into account the extent to which any penalty imposed by a national court on the same person for 
the same act has already been served.  
59 Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion on the Principle of Non bis in Idem, 14 Nov 1995 
at reg. pg 7118, cited in O Trifferter note 9 supra  at 424  
60 Id 
61 Decision on Defense Motion on the Principle of ne bis in idem (14 Nov. 1995) par 13 
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As mentioned earlier, non bis in idem is relevant also when defendants face 
multiple convictions which may arise from their indictment for several crimes with 
overlapping elements.  War crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, for 
example, contain overlapping elements.  In these instances, it is important for the 
prosecutor to avoid a multiplicity of charges relating to the same conduct.  However, 
in the absence of guidelines as to which crimes deserve the priority, this is not an easy 
task.62 Although the ICTY rejected the notion of ranking international crimes, the 
ICTR has been more receptive to the idea.63 However, neither the ICTY nor the 
ICTR has expressly provided for the ranking of international crimes in their 
constitutive documents.   
Although the jurisprudence of the ICTR and the ICTY has not been uniform, both 
ad hoc tribunals took the approach that cumulative charges phrased in the alternative 
are permissible if the same conduct contravenes more than one criminal provision. 
The tribunals took the view that potential unfairness to the accused should be 
addressed at the sentencing stage.  This was explained by the Appeal Chamber in 
Celebici: “Cumulative charging is to be allowed in light of the fact that, prior to the 
presentation of all of the evidence, it is not permissible to determine to a certainty 
which of the charges brought against the accused will be proven.  The Trial Chamber 
is better poised, after the parties’ presentation of the evidence, to evaluate which of 
the charges may be retained, based upon the sufficiency of the evidence. In addition, 
 
62 A. Bogdan “Cumulative Charges, Convictions and Sentencing at the Ad Hoc International Tribunals for 
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda” 3 Melb. J. Int’l L. 1 2002, 5 
63 Id at 15, comparing the approach in Akayesu and Kupresic 
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cumulative charging constitutes the usual practice of both this Tribunal and the 
ICTR.”64 
Though cumulative charges may be permissible if they are phrased in the 
alternative, whether cumulative convictions are justifiable is another matter.  In 
Akayesu the Trial Chamber took the view that multiple convictions for the same 
conduct is not permissible when one offence is the lesser included offence of the 
other or when one offence charges the accused as an accomplice and the other 
charges the accused as the principal offender.  In the Celebici case, the Appeal 
Chamber stated that multiple convictions based on the same set of proven facts has on 
occasion “been upheld, with potential issues of unfairness to the accused being 
addressed at the sentencing phase”.65 
The jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR both demonstrate an inclination to 
adopt the same elements test espoused by Blockburger. 66 As Bogdan points out, this 
may adversely impact on defendants’ rights.  Defendants face the possibility of being 
convicted on multiple charges for the same conduct and then run the risk of being 
twice punished for the same conduct.  Even if sentences for cumulative convictions 
run concurrently there are other potential inequities for the defendant.  Firstly, there 
are inevitable stigmas that attach to cumulative convictions.  Secondly, cumulative 
convictions may adversely affect the possibility of early release.  Finally, defendants 
will be adversely affected by habitual offender laws if they are subsequently 
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convicted in different jurisdictions.67 For these reasons, the proposition that multiple 
convictions should only be permissible if the offences are “genuinely distinct” (to be 
determined by the nature of the conduct and not the elements of the offence) is 
persuasive.  
The ICTY and the ICTR was based on the principle that the ad hoc tribunals 
would exercise concurrent jurisdiction, although the ad hoc tribunals were be granted 
primacy of jurisdiction.  These tribunals had wide powers to intervene at any stage of 
national proceedings and request the state to defer the matter to the tribunal. 
Understanding the provisions of the International Criminal Court (ICC) must be 
grounded in the reasons for its establishment.  It is therefore necessary to briefly 
explore the inadequacies of domestic courts in the fight against international crime.  
This will be accomplished by reference to East Timor and Cambodia. 
Part III: East Timor and Cambodia 
During 1975, the Indonesian army invaded the Portuguese colony of East Timor. 
Between 1975 and 1999, approximately 200 000 East Timorese were murdered in 
order to subjugate them to Indonesian rule.68 On 30 August 1999 the East Timorese 
overwhelmingly voted overwhelmingly for independence under UN supervised 
elections, as opposed to merely being granted autonomy from Indonesia.  Following 
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the announcement of the results during September 1999, Indonesian army-backed 
militias began a campaign of murder, arson, and forced expulsions.69 During January 
2000, the UN called for the establishment of an international human rights tribunal to 
prosecute the heinous misdeeds committed during 1999. The Indonesian state 
persuaded the UN to allow it to establish its own tribunal to prosecute these crimes.  
In January 2002, Indonesia established its first human right court.  At the same time, 
East Timor created its own UN-backed tribunal.   
As at January 2002 the East Timor tribunal, despite the frequent refusal of 
Indonesia to extradite suspects, had convicted ten militiamen for crimes against 
humanity.  By March 2003, the East Timor tribunal had indicted nearly 150 
individuals on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity.70 
By contrast, the Indonesian tribunal has demonstrated a marked lack of will and 
capacity to prosecute individuals for their crimes.  This is evident from the small 
number of indictments and convictions as well as the trifling sentences handed down.  
The Indonesian tribunal only convicted two defendants by December 2002 and it 
sentenced one to three years imprisonment71 and the other to ten years72. The 
sentences pale in comparison to the heinous nature of the crimes.  Furthermore, the 
 
69 http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/timor/etimor-back0829.htm 
70 Note 68, 675 
71 A former Indonesian governor, A. Soares, was sentenced to three years imprisonment for committing 
crimes against humanity. See note 67 supra at 672 
72 A deputy commander of two militia groups, E. Gutteres, was found guilty of murder as a crime against 
humanity and assault as a crime against humanity. He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. 
22
effectiveness and legitimacy of the Indonesian tribunal is severely dented by 
instances of witness intimidation, corruption and political pressure.73 
Between 1975 and 1979 between 1.7 and 2 million Cambodians perished in 
horrific circumstances at the hands of the Khmer Rouge.74 Although the Khmer 
Rouge lost power in 1979, as at 2003 there had still not been any prosecutions for the 
brutal murders that occurred during its reign of terror.75 Discussions between 
Cambodia and the UN began during 1997 with a view to establishing a mechanism to 
prosecute those responsible for the crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge.  The 
Cambodian government insisted on a domestic tribunal, despite UN disapproval, but 
nevertheless sought UN assistance.  Following disagreements over the independence 
of the proposed tribunal and the status of previous amnesties a hybrid court was 
agreed upon during June 2003.76 However, many of the criminals who could have 
been prosecuted have passed away.  
The East Timor and Cambodian situations demonstrate the enormous difficulties 
of using domestic tribunals to swiftly bring international criminals to justice.  On one 
hand, it is necessary not to unnecessarily limit national sovereignty.  On the other 
hand, the prosecution venue must be guided by the need to:  (a) conduct effective 
prosecutions (b) hold trials that meet standards of due process (c) guarantee security 
of witnesses (d) ensure that the public has access to the proceedings (e) ensure that 
the proceedings create a culture for human rights and rule of law (f) ensure that 
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criminals are not selectively prosecuted and (g) ensure that prosecutorial proceedings 
are conducted and finalized without undue delay.  
Part IV: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court  
 At the end of the Second World War, the seeds for an international criminal court 
began to germinate.  These plans, stalled by the Cold War, resurfaced in 1993-4 with 
the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals.  The evident inadequacy of domestic courts 
to deal with international crimes, coupled with the enormous financial burden of ad
hoc tribunals, led to an increasing awareness that a permanent international court was 
necessary.   
 In July 1998, 120 nations signed the Rome Statute ushering in a new era for 
international criminal law.77 By August 2003, there were 139 signatories and 91 
parties to the Statute.78 The Rome Statute created the first permanent international 
criminal tribunal with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and crimes against aggression.  Unlike the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC was 
specifically not granted primacy of jurisdiction.79 
Although the non bis in idem provisions are set out in article 20, this must be read 
together with the complementary provision in article 17.  This article precludes the 
ICC from hearing a matter if it is being investigated or prosecuted by a state, unless 
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the state is unwilling or unable to genuinely prosecute.80 In addition, the article 
provides that the ICC may not hear cases where the person concerned has already 
been tried for the conduct in question by the state.  This places a difficult standard of 
proof on the ICC prosecutor.  If the ICC displays deference to national sensitivities, it 
will be relatively easy for states to deny the ICC jurisdiction by subjecting them to 
sham investigation.81 
Before we turn to the provisions of article 20, it is necessary to mention that the 
Rome Statute prevents double punishment for the same conduct by requiring the ICC 
to deduct any time previously spent in detention under an order of the ICC.  In 
addition, the ICC is required to deduct any time otherwise spent in detention in 
connection with the conduct underlying the offence.82 Article 20 contains three 
subparagraphs.  Each of these will be considered separately.   
 Article 20(1) reads: “Except as provided for in this Statute, no person shall be 
tried before the Court with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for 
which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the Court” (Emphasis added).  
This sub-article protects against repeated prosecutions by the ICC.  The phrase 
“except as provided for in the statute” was necessary to accommodate further 
prosecutions that could result from appeals and reviews under article 81, read with 
 
80 Although the concept of inability was uncontroversial the concept of willingness to prosecute was 
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article 83(2).83 Article 20(1) refers to the conduct which formed the basis of the 
crimes and is therefore a broad formulation of the non bis in idem protection.  The 
scope of the protection depends on whether the same facts or conduct has previously 
been prosecuted by the ICC.  Accordingly, the characterization of the offence and the 
legal elements of the offence are irrelevant to the application of the non bis in idem 
principle in the sub-article.  The reference to convictions and acquittals clarifies that 
the article does not prevent further prosecutions by the ICC when there has been an 
amendment, withdrawal or non confirmation of charges.84 
Article 20(2) provides that: “No person shall be tried by another court for a crime 
referred to in article 5 for which that person has already been convicted or acquitted 
by the Court” (Emphasis added).  This sub-article prevents state parties from 
prosecuting persons for crimes referred to in article 5 (for instance, genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity) if they have been convicted or acquitted of those 
crimes by the ICC.  However, some elements of the article 5 offences constitute 
independent crimes under national law (for instance, murder is an element of 
genocide).  Accordingly, individuals may be prosecuted for crimes under national law 
even though they may have been prosecuted for the same conduct by the ICC.  The 
article therefore only protects defendants when states criminalize conduct within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.  The negotiating parties believed this limitation of non bis in 
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idem was justified because the ICC has no jurisdiction over crimes under national 
law.85 
It is submitted that national courts should have been expressly prohibited from 
prosecuting and punishing defendants again for the same conduct after their earlier 
conviction or acquittal by the ICC.  The absence of such a clause does not lie in the 
legal inability to include such a clause.  In Tadic, for instance, the IMT indicated that 
the prosecution in Germany should not proceed in respect of the same acts that were 
the subject of the prosecution by the IMT.  It merely reflects that states were not 
ready to limit their sovereignty in such a manner as to guarantee the full protection of 
non bis in idem. Of course, it is hard to defend the human rights of international 
criminals.  However, human rights are universal and must also protect the 
marginalized and most reviled in society.   
 Article 20(3) provides that: “No person who has been tried by another court for 
conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect 
to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court: 
(a)  Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
 criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(b)  Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance 
 with norms of due process recognized by international law and were 
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 conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with 
 an intent to bring the person concerned to justice” (Emphasis added) 
 Article 20(3) is without doubt the most contentious of the provisions in the Rome 
Statute.  It first sets out the general rule, to exclude further prosecutions by the ICC in 
respect of conduct already prosecuted by national courts.  The use of the word 
“conduct” makes it clear that the article operates regardless of how the crimes were 
characterized under national law.  Then the article creates two exceptions to the 
general rule: (a) where the national proceedings were a sham and (b) where the 
process was not independent, impartial or otherwise not in accordance with 
international standards of due process.  In these exceptional circumstances, conduct 
that has already prosecuted at national level may be reprosecuted by the ICC.  
Because the exceptions creates supervisory jurisdiction over national courts by the 
ICC, it was vigorously opposed by some states during the negotiations.86 
It is unclear whether the first exception, where the national proceedings were for 
the “purpose of shielding the person from criminal responsibility” for international 
crimes, will be objectively or subjectively determined.  The intention of the 
negotiating parties was to find a formulation that prescribed an objective test.87 
Tallgren claims that good faith decisions by national prosecuting authorities to 
abandon proceedings, due to the insufficiency of the evidence or because the 
prosecution does not serve the interests of justice, would be sufficient to bar a second 
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prosecution by the ICC.  However, it is submitted that reference to word “purpose” in 
sub-clause 20(3) (a) creates scope for a subjective interpretation of the article.  
Implementation of the second exception, viz. where national proceedings were not 
conducted independently, impartially or in accordance with international due process 
norms, is likely be prove challenging for the ICC.  It creates a margin of discretion for 
the ICC to evaluate national proceedings against the still unclear international 
standards of due process.88 As Tallgren points out, international law has “so far, if 
not expressly recognized, at least quietly tolerated all kinds of extraordinary and 
biased courts martial and extrajudicial solutions to large scale international crimes.”89 
It is suggested that the international standards of due process encompass, at least: the 
right to be presumed innocent, an open and public trial, an independent and impartial 
court; the right of defendants not to be compelled to testify against themselves.90 
It should be noted that article 20 does not protect against multiple criminal 
prosecutions by different contracting parties.  This is yet another indication of the 
limited protection afforded by the non bis in idem formulation in the Rome Statute.  
It should also be noted that while article 20 does not preclude the ICC from 
exercising jurisdiction over the conduct of persons who have been granted amnesty 
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via truth commissions and amnesty tribunals91 article 53 permits the prosecutor to 
abandon an investigation if it would not serve the interest of justice.   
Part V: Conclusion 
Given that the drafters of the Rome Statute looked to the Statutes of the ICTR and 
ICTY for guidance as to an appropriate formulation of non bis in idem, the significant 
textual similitude is unsurprising.  Somewhat predictably, the negotiating parties were 
unable to reach consensus on whether the common law or civil law model of non bis 
in idem would be more appropriate, which led to the adoption of a sui generis model 
that borrows from both systems.92 In any event, neither the common law model nor 
the civil law models are ideal.   
It is both natural and inevitable that non bis in idem will vary in its scope and 
application in the domestic and international environment.93 By contrast with the 
national context, international criminals may be able to harness national resources for 
their defense.94 
The adoption of the conduct based test in article 20(1) of the Rome Statute, as 
opposed to the same-elements test, must be welcomed.  This is consistent with the 
rationale of the non bis in idem principle and affords necessary protection for 
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defendants.  There is no reason why the ICC prosecutor should be afforded a second 
bite at the cherry.  
As previously mentioned, article 20(2) of the Rome Statute grants states the 
power to prosecute defendants for national crimes outside of ICC jurisdiction.  
Evaluating this article from a human rights perspective, it is apparent that this is 
manifest limitation of the non bis in idem protection.  Even if the ICC has no 
jurisdiction in respect of national crimes, this did not prevent the drafters from 
prohibiting further prosecutions and punishment in respect of the same conduct. The 
drafters’ belief that they could only limit the power of national jurisdiction in relation 
to the specific crimes provided for in the Rome Statute95 does not hold up to scrutiny.   
It is submitted that article 20(3) of the Rome Statute contains a legitimate 
limitation of state sovereignty in the two exceptions that have been created.  Firstly, 
the limitations on sovereignty are narrow in scope.  Secondly, national legal systems 
cannot be wholly trusted to genuinely prosecute international criminals.  Grave 
international crimes, such as genocide, often go hand in hand with insecure or 
illegitimate domestic legal systems.  Even after their fall from grace, international 
criminals may be able to bring enormous pressure to bear on domestic actors thereby 
decreasing the prospects of an impartial hearing.  As Judge Cassese stated in Tadic:
“It would be a travesty of law and betrayal of the universal need for justice, should 
the concept of state sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully against human 
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rights.”96 The enormous obstacles to securing justice, for international crimes, 
through national mechanisms are understood by the East Timorese and Cambodians.  
In sum, although the non bis in idem provisions may have been framed by 
necessary political compromise, certain provisions do unreasonably diminish the 
protection of defendants against vexatious repeat prosecutions by state parties.  
Defendants may prove their innocence at the ICC and yet face subsequent prosecution 
at national level for the same conduct.  In addition, it may be legitimately be argued 
that the Rome Statute might have done more to advance recognition of foreign 
criminal judgments between the contracting parties.   
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